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INTRODUCTION 
This Policy Brief explores a policy scenario for Europe of combining fiscal expansion at the country 
level with enhanced financial support from the EU Federal Government in order to spearhead an 
employment-led economic recovery. The outcomes generated by this scenario are contrasted with 
the stagnation in employment produced by a scenario that continues current austerity measures. 
Our scenario for Employment-Led Economic Recovery assumes increases in government investment, 
government income and private investment as the strategic basis to generate substantial increases in 
GDP and employment. This scenario also assumes that the budget of the EU Federal Government will 
be gradually scaled up and directed to spur public and private investment across Europe, particularly 
in the South Eurozone (e.g., Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), and that the European Investment 
Bank will also provide sizeable loans to increase private investment. In order to provide the South 
Eurozone countries with a viable initial basis for economic recovery, the EU Federal Government also 
offers them immediate substantial debt relief. 
The authors of this Policy Brief have used the CAM (Cambridge-Alphametrics Model) to compare and 
contrast the results from these two scenarios through 2020 and 2030 (see www.augurproject.eu for 
further description of the model). Both scenarios are placed within the global context of a 
moderately negative future economic trend in developed countries. The CAM is a global 
macroeconomic model that uses a comprehensive data set, stretching from 1970 to 2012, to project 
future outcomes based on scenarios that assume major differences in policies. 
The ‘baseline’ scenario for our projections assumes that the current basic direction of austerity 
policies is maintained through 2030. Thus, this scenario assumes, for instance, that governments will 
continue to cut their expenditures in a concerted effort to reduce budget deficits and bring down 
debt-to-GDP ratios to below 60% (in line with the requirements of the Growth and Stability pact). 
Not surprisingly, such an effort is likely to be quixotic when the denominator of this ratio, GDP, is not 
growing. 
In contrast, our scenario of an Employment-Led Economic Recovery assumes that governments will 
maintain their expenditures in order to help generate the economic momentum necessary to 
substantially raise employment levels. However, maintaining expenditures does not translate into 
higher debt/GDP ratios for two reasons: 1) complementary increases in government revenues from 
initially low levels are implemented and 2) the resultant growth rates are high enough to reduce the 
debt ratio over time because of the increase in GDP. 
Because the CAM is a global model, it relies mainly on aggregating countries into meaningful blocs. 
This structure is maintained for the current exercise. For European scenarios, for example, it works 
with four blocs (the North Eurozone, the South Eurozone, Scandinavia and East Europe) and one 
major country (the United Kingdom). The North Eurozone includes, for instance, France and 
Germany; the South Eurozone includes Italy and Spain; Scandinavia includes Denmark and Sweden; 
and East Europe the Czech Republic and Poland. 
The principal employment indicator that this exercise uses is the ratio of the total employed to the 
total working-age population. The Austerity Scenario projects that this ratio will basically stagnate in 
all blocs through both 2020 and 2030. One obvious reason is that economic growth is also projected 
to essentially stagnate during these time periods. 
In contrast, our scenario for Employment-Led Economic Recovery deliberately targets historically 
significant increases in the ratio of the employed to the working-age population. For instance, it 
targets a ratio of 75% for Scandinavia, the North Eurozone and the United Kingdom. Since historical 
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employment levels have been much lower in the South Eurozone and East Europe, the scenario 
targets a ratio of 65% for these two blocs—a rate that is still relatively ambitious.  
POLICIES FOR ECONOMY RECOVERY: THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
What policy package and EU reforms does the scenario for Employment-Led Economic Recovery 
recommend? Extensive previous work with such scenarios suggests that policy initiatives solely at the 
bloc and country level will confront great difficulties in generating the desired outcomes. Hence, this 
scenario assumes that additional resources will made available and policy initiatives will be 
strengthened at the Federal level of the European Union in order to reach the targeted employment 
levels.  
The core recommendation is that the EU budget be increased gradually from the present level of a 
mere 1% of EU GDP to a more effective level of 4% by 2021. For the CAM programming, this budget 
expansion is financed by increases in progressive taxes on income and wealth across Europe.  
In addition, there is a provision for running a modest fiscal deficit at the Federal level. This deficit 
rises to no more than 0.3% of EU GDP. Both expanding the EU budget and running a deficit would 
necessitate setting up a Ministry of Finance at the Federal level. But this Policy Brief is not designed 
to address such institutional issues, which would require a much longer discussion.  
The primary immediate intent of such an EU budget expansion is to allocate substantially more 
investment funds to the South Eurozone on the basis of fiscal transfers from surplus countries, 
primarily those of the North Eurozone. This allocation provides a mechanism to counteract the 
underlying structural asymmetry of this currency union. This asymmetry is reflected in an 
undervalued real exchange rate for the North Eurozone and a correspondingly overvalued real 
exchange rate for the South Eurozone, without the possibility of either bloc being able to revalue its 
nominal exchange rate.  
The scenarios’ mobilization of additional investment funds is carried out on the basis of two criteria: 
1) a bloc’s employment shortfall relative to an 85% ratio of the employed to the working-age 
population and 2) a bloc’s total population.  
These criteria imply that the South Eurozone will receive significant net fiscal transfers from the 
expanded resources at the Federal level (reaching a maximum of about +4.6% of its own GDP by 
2030). East Europe will also be a net recipient of EU funding (receiving a maximum of 1.7% of its 
GDP). The net contributors to the EU budget will be the North Eurozone (providing, at most, 1.3% of 
its own GDP), Scandinavia (also 1.3%) and the United Kingdom (0.6%). 
In addition, this scenario assumes an increase in private investment through enhanced lending from 
the European Investment Bank (EIB). One of the major constraints holding back economic recovery is 
the historically low levels of private investment across Europe as a whole. The EIB can raise funds for 
such critically important lending by issuing bonds at reasonable rates on the international capital 
market. Moreover, borrowing from the EIB does not count as part of the national debt of any EU 
member country. 
Lastly, this scenario assumes that the EU will provide debt relief to the heavily indebted countries of 
the South Eurozone by expanding the powers of the European Stability Mechanism (the ESM) to 
shoulder their debt burden that exceeds 60% of GDP. At the EU level, such debt would represent 
about 7% of collective GDP. The ESM and its precursor, the European Financial Stability Facility, 
already have the mandate to help debt-distressed countries by buying their debt. But the proposal in 
this scenario would represent a significant expansion of the ESM’s function. Previous work on the 
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CAM has underlined the importance of early debt relief in providing the South Eurozone with the 
basis for any significant economic recovery.  
POLICIES FOR ECONOMY RECOVERY: THE BLOC LEVEL 
At the bloc level, the Employment-Led Economic Recovery assumes two major policy initiatives: 1) 
maintaining government expenditures at levels close to those achieved prior to the 2008 global crisis, 
instead of substantially slashing them, and 2) stimulating private investment in order to raise it from 
the woefully low levels to which it has plummeted in the wake of the financial crisis.  
These two policies are linked by prioritizing public investment, which can have a significant stimulus 
effect on private investment. Lending by the EIB at the Federal level is also assumed to enhance 
private investment. As a result, the scenario targets a level of private investment as a ratio to GDP of 
18% across most blocs. However, since the United Kingdom has a particularly low level of private 
investment, the target for it is 15%. 
For the North Eurozone, the South Eurozone, East Europe and the United Kingdom, the scenario 
targets levels of government expenditure to GDP of 24-26%. The one exception is Scandinavia: its 
level of government expenditure to GDP is targeted at 32% since it starts from a comparatively 
higher level.  These expenditure figures include only current and capital expenditures on goods and 
services (not transfers). 
But, in order to avoid a substantial increase in fiscal deficits across Europe, the Employment-Led 
scenario also assumes a rise in government revenue which, together with the fiscal transfers from 
the Federal level mentioned above, will help close any problematic financing gap. This rise in 
government revenue will occur partly through increases in taxable incomes as a result of enhanced 
growth. 
For four of the five European blocs, the scenario adopts a target for government revenue as a ratio to 
GDP of 22-24%. For Scandinavia, which already has a high level of revenue, the target is 33% of GDP. 
In addition to the measures for government expenditures and revenue and boosts to private 
investment, the scenario also assumes some degree of reflation in the North Eurozone. This effect 
results from a 0.7% yearly boost to the ratio of consumption to private income, based on an assumed 
rise in the share of wages in national income.  
This assumption is designed to counteract the past wage repression in this bloc and stimulate 
domestic sources of growth. Such a policy should also help augment exports to the North Eurozone 
from the other four European blocs. 
In order to address any problems with the trade balances, the scenario also assumes changes in the 
real exchange rate for the three blocs which are not part of the Eurozone: the United Kingdom, 
Scandinavia and East Europe. It is assumed that East Europe does not join the Eurozone since the 
Austerity Scenario shows that immediately in 2015, when it is projected to join the currency union, 
its current account immediately starts to markedly deteriorate.  
For the United Kingdom, the scenario assumes a 26% depreciation of the real exchange rate, from 
1.08 to 0.80. For each bloc, the real exchange rate is measured relative to the real exchange rate of 
the US dollar. The depreciation by the UK is necessary in order to help close its projected current 
account deficit. For East Europe a depreciation of about 15% in its real exchange rate is assumed in 
order to contain an eventual deterioration in its current account after about 2020. For Scandinavia, 
there is a projected long-term trend of appreciation of its real exchange rate above its starting-point 
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of about 1.5 in 2012. This appreciation is contained at 1.7 in order to enable it to continue generating 
current-account surpluses.  
SCENARIO PROJECTIONS 
 
Employment 
What are the results from the policies assumed in the scenario for Employment-Led Economic 
Recovery? The most important result is the gains in employment, namely, the ratio of the employed 
to the working-age population. For this key variable, the scenario’s targets are basically met. 
Figure 1 shows the results for the North Eurozone and the South Eurozone as an illustration of the 
general results. In the North Eurozone, employment is projected to rise from about 66% in 2012 to 
71% in 2020, and then to about 75% in 2030. In the South Eurozone, employment rises from 55.6% in 
2012 to 60% in 2020, and then to over 64% in 2030.  
Figure 1. Employment as % of Working-Age Population 
 
These projected employment rates are impressive in comparison to past trends. This is especially the 
case in the South Eurozone, where employment has fallen sharply since 2008. In the North Eurozone, 
employment has essentially stagnated since 2008 but it is projected to resume its earlier trend rate 
of increase after 2013. 
The results for the United Kingdom, East Europe and Scandinavia are also basically in line with the 
intended results. Scandinavia’s employment was already at a fairly high level (namely, 71%) in 2012 
so the projected increase to over 75% in 2030 is modest. However, the results for the other two 
blocs are more significant. The UK’s employment is projected to rise from 67.6% in 2012 to almost 
76% in 2030. East Europe’s employment starts in 2012 at a low level, i.e., only 53.5%, but is projected 
to expand impressively to 66.4% by 2030. 
It is important to note that such employment gains are not achieved at the cost of lowered labour 
productivity. In two of the five European blocs, the projected trend in labour productivity is similar to 
that maintained before the financial crisis. In the other three blocs, the future trend in labour 
productivity is higher than in the past. 
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Economic Growth and Inflation 
Table 1 shows that all of the European blocs experience significantly more positive rates during 
2013-2020 and 2021-2030 than they do under the Austerity Scenario. The economic growth rates for 
the Austerity Scenario are listed in the parentheses for each bloc. In the Employment-Led Scenario, 
economic growth is projected to slow down during 2021-2030 in some of the core European blocs as 
the impact of the initial fiscal stimulus begins to subside. 
However, Scandinavia’s performance is projected to be only modestly better than it would achieve 
under the Austerity Scenario. In contrast, East Europe is projected to achieve high rates of growth: 
6% during 2013-2020 and 5.1% during 2021-2030. These represent a much better prospect than that 
projected for continued austerity, i.e. less than 2% growth. 
The projected growth rates for the North Eurozone, the South Eurozone and the United Kingdom are 
roughly in the same range over these two periods, i.e., 2% to 4%. Though not high, these rates are 
certainly much better than the roughly zero growth rates produced by the Austerity Scenario. The 
United Kingdom has the most impressive growth rate, rising, for example, to an average of 3.1% 
during 2021-2030.  
Table 1. Average GDP Growth (%) 
 
2008 - 2012 2013 - 2020 2021 - 2030 
North Eurozone 
 
0.4 
 
2.7 
(0.4) 
1.7 
(-0.3) 
South Eurozone 
 
-1.4 
 
2.8 
(-0.3) 
2.0 
(-0.1) 
East Europe 
 
1.5 
 
6.0 
(1.7) 
5.1 
(1.8) 
United Kingdom 
 
-0.5 
 
2.2 
(-0.3) 
3.1 
(-0.1) 
Scandinavia 
 
0.2 
 
2.1 
(1.7) 
1.7 
(1.1) 
The economic growth rates mentioned above are not associated with high inflation rates. Only in 
Scandinavia during the initial period of the Employment-Led scenario (i.e., 2013-2020) is price 
inflation projected to significantly exceed 3%. During the same early period, inflation only slightly 
exceeds 3% in the North Eurozone. And in the later period of 2021-2030, price inflation in the United 
Kingdom approaches 3% as its economic growth accelerates towards 4% by 2030. Later in this Policy 
Brief there is a related discussion of each bloc’s real exchange rate and its relationship to its trade 
balance. 
Private Investment 
One of the key constraints on growth in all of the European blocs is the long-term decline in private 
investment, which results in historically very low levels by 2012. The scenario for Employment-Led 
Economic Recovery assumes important but fairly moderate increases in private investment through 
2020 and 2030.  
In four of the five European blocs, private investment as a ratio to GDP is projected to come close to 
the scenario target of 18%. Figure 2 shows the trajectory of private investment for the South 
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Eurozone, where there is a significant boost of such investment to about 18% as early as 2020. This 
result contrasts with that for the Austerity Scenario, in which private investment recovers to about 
14% of GDP only by 2030. 
Figure 2 also highlights the results for the United Kingdom. Its private investment starts in 2012 at an 
abysmally low level of 11.4% in 2012 and reaches only 13.3% by 2020 and 15.5% by 2030. Although 
private investment is not a direct policy variable in the way that government expenditure is, the 
modest results across the five European blocs suggest, nevertheless, that increasing the economic 
growth of these blocs in the future will have to rely on mobilizing more concerted policy initiatives, 
such as bolstering public investment, enhancing bank lending and implementing strategic structural 
policies, in order to boost private investment to adequate levels. 
Figure 2. Investment as % of GDP 
 
Fiscal Balance: Expenditures and Revenue 
What are the projected fiscal balances of the five European blocs? The scenario for Employment-Led 
Economic Recovery assumes that government expenditures are maintained at levels achieved just 
before the onset of the global crisis and that government revenues are increased to levels 
commensurate with expenditures. This configuration is in stark contrast to the Austerity Scenario, 
which projects dramatically reduced government expenditures while government revenues are held 
close to the relatively low levels experienced in the wake of the financial crisis. 
Figure 3 illustrates these trends with the examples of government expenditures in the North 
Eurozone and East Europe. In the former, the ratio of government expenditures to GDP is maintained 
throughout 2013-2020 and 2021-2030 at about 24.5%, a level that is only slightly below its peak of 
about 25% before the 2008 crisis. Similarly, in East Europe during these two periods government 
expenditures as a ratio to GDP are maintained at just under 25%, slightly below the peak of over 25% 
attained before 2008. 
Under the assumptions of the Austerity Scenario, government expenditures as a ratio to GDP falls 
sharply in the North Eurozone to about 20.5% by 2030 and in East Europe to 18% by the same year. 
One of the possible drawbacks often cited of implementing expansionary fiscal policies is the 
widening of fiscal deficits. But just the opposite is the case in this scenario. One major reason is its 
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targeting of significant increases in government revenue. Another is the Federal policy of directing 
fiscal transfers to the South Eurozone and East Europe, the two blocs that have been running the 
largest fiscal deficits. 
In the South Eurozone, government revenue is projected to reach about 25% of GDP in 2020 and 
about 26.5% of GDP in 2030, both of which are well above its bloc-level target of 22% because of the 
inflow of Federal fiscal transfers. Both East Europe and the United Kingdom come close to their 
revenue targets of 24% of GDP only by 2030. However, government revenue in the North Eurozone 
only reaches a peak of 23.7% of GDP, instead of its targeted level of 25%, because of its net 
contribution of revenue to the Federal budget. 
Figure 3. Government Expenditure as % of GDP 
 
 
In general, fiscal deficits are projected to be reduced to levels below -1% of GDP by 2030 in the 
scenario for Employment-Led Economic Recovery. Thus, this scenario cannot be dismissed on the 
basis of promoting fiscal profligacy. Table 2 shows the fiscal balances of each bloc plus its 
corresponding net fiscal transfers to/from the EU.  Since there were no fiscal transfers in 2012, the 
table starts with 2013. 
Table 2. Fiscal Balances and Net Fiscal Transfers as % of GDP 
    2013 2020 2030 
North Eurozone 
  
Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -4.9 -1.3 -0.8 
Net Fiscal Transfer (% GDP) -0.4 -1.1 -1.3 
South Eurozone 
  
Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -7.2 -1.2 0.6 
Net Fiscal Transfer (% GDP) 1.2 3.9 4.6 
East Europe 
  
Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -5.6 -2.2 -1.0 
Net Fiscal Transfer (% GDP) 0.8 1.7 1.1 
United Kingdom 
  
Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -8.5 -1.3 -0.6 
Net Fiscal Transfer (% GDP) -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 
Scandinavia 
  
Fiscal Balance (% GDP) 2.3 -0.4 -0.2 
Net Fiscal Transfer (% GDP) -0.4 -1.3 -1.2 
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Since the South Eurozone is a major recipient of Federal fiscal transfers, its government net lending 
as a ratio to GDP becomes slightly positive after about 2025 and reaches a +0.6% by 2030. The fiscal 
deficit in East Europe, which is also a net recipient of fiscal transfers, closes more slowly, reaching a -
1% of GDP by 2030.  
In the North Eurozone, the largest net contributor to the Federal budget, the fiscal deficit closes to 
under -1% of GDP after about 2020. Scandinavia and the United Kingdom, which are also net 
contributors to the Federal budget, only run fiscal deficits between -0.2% and -0.6% of GDP after 
about 2020. 
Government Debt 
As a result of the above trends in government expenditures and revenue, as well as the acceleration 
in economic growth after 2012, government debt falls appreciably in all five European blocs, 
beginning roughly after 2015. In almost all cases, the Employment-Led Scenario generates larger 
drops in debt than the Austerity Scenario. Figure 4 illustrates these results with the examples of the 
United Kingdom and the South Eurozone.  
Figure 4. Government Debt as % of GDP 
 
The United Kingdom starts in 2012 with a heavy burden of debt, that is, about 100% of GDP.  In the 
CAM data base, debt is measured on a cash basis. After a projected initial rise to about 108%, this 
ratio is projected to fall dramatically, reaching about 63% by 2030. Though still high, this resultant 
level represents a marked improvement. This level of debt is also significantly lower than that 
projected in the Austerity Scenario, which would still be about 80% in 2030. 
Figure 4 illustrates that the South Eurozone is the major beneficiary of debt relief from the European 
Stability Mechanism. This means that its initial burden of debt, which represents 100% of GDP in 
2012, is reduced by 40 percentage points so that it starts 2013 with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60%. Over 
time this bloc is able to further reduce this ratio, so that by 2030 it has dropped to about 47%. 
In 2012 Scandinavia already had a debt that stood at about 42% of GDP. However, the Austerity 
Scenario produces a dramatic rise in its debt to well over 60% of GDP. In contrast, the Employment-
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Led Scenario succeeds in reducing its debt burden to just 18% of GDP by 2030. East Europe already 
had a debt-to-GDP ratio that was about 55% in 2012. Both the Austerity Scenario and the 
Employment-Led Scenario dramatically reduce this burden. In the employment-focused scenario the 
debt ratio drops to about 38%. 
The North Eurozone starts in 2012 with a debt that is about 63% of GDP but under the Employment-
Led Scenario its debt progressively declines, reaching about 50% in 2030. In stark contrast, the 
Austerity Scenario prompts a pronounced rise in its debt to over 80% of GDP by 2030. 
The Trade Balance 
Since the five European blocs are projected to grow primarily on the basis of stimulating government 
expenditures and private investment, there exists a danger of deterioration in their trade balances as 
a result of increased import demand. Table 2 shows the trends in the trade balance and compares 
these to changes in the real exchange rate for each of the five blocs. The real exchange rate of each 
bloc is presented as a ratio to the real exchange rate of the United States, which remains 
comparatively flat throughout the projected period to 2030.  
There is indeed a reduction in the substantial trade surpluses of both the North Eurozone and 
Scandinavia as the real exchange rates of both blocs appreciate. Although the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate of Scandinavia is contained in the Employment-Led Scenario, nevertheless, its rate 
still appreciates by 15% relative to its level in 2012. There is a slightly sharper appreciation of 19% in 
the real exchange rate of the North Eurozone. However, both blocs still continue to run modest trade 
surpluses throughout the period to 2030. 
In contrast, the depreciation of the UK pound by 26%, which follows from the programming of the 
Employment-Led Scenario, helps this bloc to progressively reduce its trade deficit from about -2.2% 
of GDP in 2012 and eventually squeak out a +0.5% surplus in 2030. 
Eastern Europe appears to have deeper structural problems that impede its ability to consistently run 
trade surpluses. The assumed delay in its joining the Eurozone and the assumed depreciation of its 
real exchange rate do produce trade surpluses for a few years until 2020. But thereafter these 
surpluses turn into worsening deficits that approach -2% of GDP by 2030. This trend coincides with 
an appreciation of about 16% of its real exchange rate between 2020 and 2030. 
Table 3.The Trade Balance as % of GDP and the Real Exchange Rate 
  2012 2015 2020 2030 
North Eurozone Trade Balance 2.27 3.16 2.27 1.27 
Real Exchange Rate 1.20 1.16 1.24 1.43 
South Eurozone Trade Balance -0.32 0.59 -0.41 -1.43 
Real Exchange Rate 1.07 0.97 0.96 1.07 
East Europe Trade Balance -1.66 -0.38 0.56 -1.94 
Real Exchange Rate 0.67 0.57 0.49 0.57 
United Kingdom Trade Balance -2.24 -1.89 -1.61 0.05 
Real Exchange Rate 1.08 0.99 0.89 0.80 
Scandinavia Trade Balance 5.82 2.94 1.09 0.92 
Real Exchange Rate 1.48 1.49 1.63 1.70 
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The South Eurozone begins to experience worsening trade deficits after about 2015. This trend 
coincides with an appreciation of its real exchange of about 10% between 2015 and 2030. 
Nevertheless, this bloc’s deficits only exceed -1% of GDP after about 2025. Meanwhile, this bloc’s 
current account remains in surplus because of the inflow of fiscal transfers from the Federal budget. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of our modelling of policy-relevant future scenarios for Europe has been to gauge the 
viability of a strategy of promoting employment-focused economic recovery and contrast its 
outcomes to those produced by the current alternative of persisting with austerity measures. The 
time horizons for our scenarios have been 2013-2020 and 2021-2030.  
Our conclusion is that such a strategy is indeed feasible but it requires greater intervention by the EU 
Federal government. For our Employment-Led Scenario, this intervention implies substantially more 
EU funding of public investment, greater lending for private investment and significant debt relief for 
the heavily indebted countries in the South Eurozone. 
At the bloc level, this strategy explicitly gears a range of policy measures to promoting employment 
as their overriding objective. These policies include maintaining government expenditures, especially 
public investment, at pre-crisis levels, and closing any ensuing fiscal deficits by raising government 
revenue above its low crisis-induced levels. The emphasis on public investment at the bloc level is 
designed to help stimulate private investment, which has languished at pitifully low levels across the 
continent.  
The results generated by our Employment-Led Scenario are generally impressive, particularly in 
contrast to the bleak prospects being produced by the strategy of protracted austerity. Most 
importantly, employment reaches historically high levels, and economic growth rises well above the 
current rates that are hovering close to zero in most European blocs, as well as above the similarly 
low projected rates under the Austerity Scenario.  
A rise in private investment is partially responsible for overcoming the stagnation in economic 
growth. However, more concerted policy initiatives will have to be undertaken over the medium 
term to lift private investment back up to its pre-crisis levels. Such an initiative could play an 
important part in raising economic growth rates consistently above 3% through 2030. 
As a result of trends in both government expenditures and revenues, fiscal deficits are closed to 
manageable levels. Also, most importantly, debt-to-GDP levels plummet across the five blocs. Of 
course, the South Eurozone benefits immediately from being relieved of the portion of its debt that 
exceeds 60% of GDP. But accelerating economic growth also plays a major role in decreasing debt 
burdens across the continent. 
The expansionary fiscal policies implied by this scenario do not lead to major trade deficits. But the 
blocs with historically sizeable trade surpluses, such as the North Eurozone and Scandinavia, do 
experience a secular decline in their surplus positions. In general, the blocs outside the Eurozone, 
including Scandinavia as well as East Europe and the United Kingdom, are obliged to undertake 
measures to depreciate their real exchange rate or contain, at least, its appreciation.  
Thus, achieving significant increases in GDP and employment across Europe will not be easy, but it is 
certainly attainable. However, it will imply the implementation of a range of expansionary 
macroeconomic policies at both the country and the EU-wide level. These initiatives imply that the 
European Union will have to become a more coordinated and more progressive-minded economic 
bloc. The political realism of such policies has to be based, first of all, on their economic realism. It is 
the latter issue that has been the focus of this Policy Brief. 
 
